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INTRODUCTION 
Vali's effort to reply to DOH's brief in this matter 
was made extremely difficult by the manner in which DOH presented 
its "facts." As support for the great majority of its alleged 
facts, DOH cites to its own briefs filed in the lower court, 
which in almost every instance contained no record authority. 
DOH has also gratuitously stated "facts" without any support 
whatsoever, and has grossly distorted the record below in the 
very few instances in which it is actually referred to. The net 
result is that a number of facts are now in issue that never were 
in issue before, and therefore, were not made a part of the 
record below. 
In order to effectively respond to DOH's contentions, 
Vali has, in some instances, had to supply this Court with facts 
from its own knowledge and/or records. Vali acknowledges that 
this is somewhat uncharacteristic on appeal, but requests the 
Court's indulgence in order that a misleading impression is not 
left with this Court by DOHfs statements in its brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. At all relevant times, Vali owned and operated 
four nursing homes which provided health care services to State 
Medicaid recipients for the time period January 1, 1978 through 
June 30, 1979. Vali became the owner of these four nursing homes 
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in March 1977. (Stipulation of Facts, II 1; R. 101, p.. 3; 
Transcript, pp. 34-35.) 
2. In 1978, Vali entered ir.to an agreement with the 
Utah State Department of Social Services, Department of Health, 
for each of its four nursing homes to provide these health care 
services. (Utah State Dept. of Social Services Nursing Facility 
Provider Agreement; R. 103. p. 3.) 
3. Vali was to receive monthly payments for the 
health care services it provided to State Medicaid recipients 
that amounted to a set figure per patient day based upon the 
overall costs to run each nursing home. (Brief of Respondent, 
p. 2) 
4. The set figure that was to be paid per patient day 
was to be calculated from cost information supplied to the 
Department of Health on a yearly basis. This cost information 
was supplied to the DOH on forms styled Facility Cost Profiles 
("FCPs"). (Brief of Respondent, p. 2) 
5. Since Vali was a new nursing home owner for which 
the DOH had little or no financial information, the first FCPs it 
filed would be used to determine recipient rates on a prospective 
basis. In contrast, an established nursing home received 
1 Vali is not aware whether this document was ever made a part 
of the record. If the Court desires, a copy will be provided 
prior to oral argument in this matter. 
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reimbursement on patient rates on a both retrospective and 
prospective basis. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 5, 11) 
6. In January 1980, Vali submitted FCPs to the DOH 
that specified the services provided by Vali for the period 
January 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979 and the costs of those 
services that had been incurred. These were the first FCPs ever 
filed by Vali with the DOH. (Stipulation of Facts, 11 1; See 
Footnote 1.) 
7. Vali had been providing services to State Medicaid 
recipients prior to January, 1980 and had been reimbursed on an 
interim basis based upon incomplete financial data from the 
previous owners of the nursing homes. (R. 101, p. 3.) 
8. Pursuant to the terms of its contract with Vali, 
the DOH was required to determine if the costs claimed by Vali in 
their FCPs were allowable costs in accordance with the reimburse-
ment manual for nursing facilities. The DOH is required to 
complete this process within a reasonable time and to set new 
patient rates. In Vali's case, these would be the first rates 
ever set on the basis of Vali's financial cost information. If 
Vali was dissatisfied with the results of the audit, it was 
entitled to three levels of administrative review pursuant to the 
policies and procedures of the DOH. These three levels of review 
are entitled Exit Conference, Informal Hearing and Formal Hear-
ing. (Utah State Dept. of Social Services Nursing Facility 
Provider Agreement; Brief of Respondent, p. 3; Administrative 
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Hearing Procedures for Medicaid Recipients and Providers; Medic-
aid State Plan, Attachment 4.19D; See Footnote 1.) 
9. The DOH required and does require explicit docu-
mentation on costs claimed on any FCPs. (Medicaid State Plan, 
Attachment 4.19D; See Footnote 1.) 
10. Following the filing of Vali's FCPs in January, 
1980, the DOH referred the FCPs to the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud. 
The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, pursuant to a search warrant, 
2 
seized every business record of Vali on September 12, 1980. 
11. The reason for the investigation of Vali by the 
Bureau of Medicaid Fraud was the allegation that Vali had claimed 
certain costs' that had not been incurred. (See Footnote 2.) 
12. The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud conducted an exhaus-
tive investigation for a period of 2h years. At the conclusion 
of that investigation, on April 22, 1982, the Bureau stated that 
there was insufficient evidence to support criminal charges 
against Vali or any of its principals. (Stipulation of Facts, 
U 2 and Exhibit A thereto.) 
13. At the conclusion of the investigation, only part 
of Vali's business documents were returned, and those were in 
2
 There is no record citation available for this fact. How-
ever, Vali does not believp rh*t DOH contests this fact. Vali is 
in possession of certain documents that support this claim that 
will be filed if the Court desires. 
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such disarray as to make them virtually worthless. (R. 160, Ex, 
4.) 3 
14. During the period of the investigation, the DOH 
did not complete its required audit of the FCPs. During the 
period of the investigation, once again, Vali was paid an 
"interim" rate for services it provided to State Medicaid recipi-
ents. (Stipulation of Facts, f 2; See Footnote 2.) 
15. At the conclusion of the investigation by the 
Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, the DOH sent letters to Vali claiming 
it had completed its audit of the FCPs and that Vali owed the DOH 
the sum of $177,385.62 for overpayments made. (See Footnote 2.) 
16. Following the conclusion of the investigation by 
the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, Vali began to reconstruct its 
business records. Those business records and documents would form 
the basis of most of Vali's claims during the following Exit 
Conferences and Informal Hearings. (R. 160; See Footnote 3.) 
17. The DOH agreed to hold Exit Conferences which 
began in 1984. The bulk of those Exit Conferences consisted of 
Vali supplying documentation in support of its claimed expenses 
for its FCPs for the time period 1978 and 1979. This 
3
 This information is from Vali's counsel, who has represented 
Vali since 1980. No attempt was made to substantiate this fact 
in the Third District Court because DOH did not raise it as a 
contested issue. 
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documentation process could have taken place in 1980 rather than 
1984 but for the conduct of the DOH, (See Footnotes 2, 3.) 
18. At the conclusion of the Exit Conferences in 1984, 
the DOH had not completed a computation to determine if Vali 
still owed the DOH any money. Those Exit Conferences continued 
until February, 1984. (See Footnote 3.) 
19. Vali was not satisfied with the result of the Exit 
Conferences and, on March 25, 1983, timely requested an Informal 
Hearing on several matters not resolved by the Exit Conferences. 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 6) 
20. Informal hearings were held during 1984 to resolve 
largely documentary problems on cost issues in the FCPs. On 
October 25, 1984, during one portion of the informal hearing 
process, a request was made of the DOH to recompute a total 
figure in light of the changes in the FCPs made during the Exit 
Conferences and the Informal Hearings to date. On December 7, 
1984, the DOH sent a letter to Vali indicating that the DOH now 
owed Vali $223,046.66 as a result of those changes. This repre-
sents a change in the DOH's position of $400,432.28 (the DOH's 
claim originally that Vali owed $177,385.62 to the position that 
the DOH now owed Vali $223,046.66). (See Footnotes 2, 3; Stipu-
lation of Facts, f 7 and Exhibit D thereto) 
21. The DOH issued a check in the amount of 
$185,466.66 on January 31, 1985. This figure represents 
$223,046.66, minus $37,580 to be held by the DOH on another 
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unrelated issue. (Stipulation of Facts, II 7 and Exhibit D 
thereto) 
22. In January 1985, Clark Graves, an Assistant 
Attorney General assigned to the case, drafted a Release of All 
Claims to accompany the check for $185,466.66. Counsel for Vali 
and Graves were unable to agree on the language to be contained 
in the Release of All Claims due to the issue of whether any 
interest was due on that money. The DOH, through its counsel and 
its audit manager, was fully aware that Vali intended to make a 
claim for interest, by January, 1985. (Transcript, pp. 129, 
138-139) 
23. The check for $185,466.66 was returned 
unnegotiated to the DOH and the Informal Hearing process contin-
ued its normal administrative course. The Informal Hearing 
concluded on February 28, 1985, and a decision was issued by the 
DOH concluding that it now owed Vali $272,362.03, exclusive of 
any interest. This figure represented a change in the DOH's 
position of $449,747,65 (the DOH's claim originally that Vali 
owed them $177,385.62 to the position that the DOH now owed Vali 
$272,362.03). (Stipulation of Facts, U 13 and Exhibit H thereto) 
24. The DOH and Vali agreed that the $272,362.03 
figure represented money due to Vali for all issues raised at the 
Informal Hearing. The DOH and Vali further agreed and do agree 
that interest on any amounts due was not discussed at the Infor-
mal Hearing. (Stipulation of Facts, KK 12, 21) 
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25. A meeting was held at the DOH's office on March 
13, 1985. Participants included the acting director of the 
Division of Health Care Financing, an Informal Hearing officer, 
an audit manager, Clark Graves—Assistant Attorney General, 
Richard Brown, James B. Lee and Spencer E. Austin, counsel for 
Vali. At that meeting, Vali informed the DOH that the issue of 
interest had not been settled by the Informal Hearings. All 
parties agreed that interest had not been raised as a definable 
issue during the Informal Hearings. The DOH agreed that the 
$272,362.03 amount should be paid to Vali and if Vali believed it 
had any issue regarding interest, that could be taken up in a 
Formal Hearing. (Stipulation of Facts, f 20; Transcript, p. 77.) 
26. On or about May 16, 1985, the DOH issued a check 
in the amount of $274,223.17 to Vali, which Vali cashed on that 
date. This check represented $272,362.03 in underpayments made 
to Vali and $1,361.14 in interest, from the date of DOH's agree-
ment to pay to the date of payment. (Stipulation of Facts, 
UK 23, 24 and Exhibits Q and R thereto.) 
27. Subsequently, Vali made a timely request for a 
Formal Hearing, at which the single issue was whether Vali was 
entitled to any interest on the principal sum paid. (Stipulation 
of Facts, 1f 25.) 
28. After evidence was received at the Formal Hearing, 
the Administrative Law Judge found in favor of Vali and stated in 
his written opinion: 
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There is nothing complex or mysterious about 
it. Respondent should pay the claimant 
interest and ought to do so without further 
delays. 
(R. 13-48, p. 7.) 
29. The Executive Director of the Department of 
Health, without having heard any evidence, overturned that 
decision and denied Vali any interest on the sum of money previ-
ously paid. (Brief of Respondent, p. 9.) 
RESPONSE TO DOITS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its Brief of Respondent/Cross-Appellant, the DOH in 
its Statement of Facts has taken certain "facts" out of context, 
and totally distorted the events cited. 
DOH FACT 8 - Vali's interim rate for the time period of 
the FCPs was calculated upon FCPs filed by former owners of the 
Vali facilities. That interim rate was not based upon financial 
data provided by Vali. 
DOH FACT 9 - There was no dispute regarding the FCPs 
that were submitted for the time period January 1, 1978 to June 
30, 1979. The DOH simply refused to follow its normal procedures 
in conducting a desk audit and allowing the owner of Vali to 
present such documentary evidence as they felt necessary to 
support their costs. 
DOH FACT 10 - The Bureau of Medicaid Fraud did not 
undertake the investigation of Vali on its own initiative but had 
the matter referred to them by the DOH. 
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DOH FACT 11 - Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation does not 
indicate that settlement negotiations were stayed pending the 
conclusion of the investigation. Paragraph 2 indicates that the 
DOH could not complete its adjustments to the FCPs in 1980 due to 
the investigation that was being conducted by the Bureau of 
Medicaid Fraud. Vali did not consent to any delay in the normal 
adjustment process to the FCPs. 
DOH FACT 13 - Following the conclusion of the investi-
gation, the DOH claimed that Vali owed it approximately 
$177,385.62 in overpayments. 
DOH FACT 14 - Vali did not voluntarily wait until March 
25, 1983 in which to request an informal administrative hearing. 
On September 12, 1980, the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud, pursuant to 
a search warrant, seized virtually every business document of 
Vali. Following the conclusion of the investigation in April 
1982, only partial records were returned to Vali. Those records 
that were returned were in such a disarray as to make them 
virtually worthless without literally hundreds of hours at 
reconstruction. (See Footnote 3.) 
DOH FACT 15 - The DOH wishes this Court to believe that 
the exit conferences and informal hearings in this matter were 
delayed entirely as a result of Vali. In fact, there were 
several delays that were requests from the DOH on the basis of 
their employees being unavailablp for said hearings. (See 
Footnotes 2, 3.) 
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DOH FACT 16 - The record citation for Fact 16 actually 
shows a disallowance of slightly more than $450,000. It should 
also be noted that the exit conferences and informal hearings 
were in large part an effort of Vali to document its claimed 
expenses on the FCPs. (See Footnotes 2, 3.) 
DOH FACT 18 - There was no proposed "final settlement11 
on March 20, 1985. The record indicates that, as early as 
December 1984, the DOH was aware that Vali intended to reserve 
the issue of interest to be raised at a later time. 
DOH FACT 19 & 20 - There was no "final settlement11 
regarding the interest issue. The DOH was aware, as early as 
December of 1984, that regardless of the settlement of the 
principal claim, Vali intended to preserve its claim to interest 
to be raised at a later time. 
DOH FACT 21 - Paragraph 21 of the Statement of Facts by 
the DOH is an absolute distortion of the record and the facts. 
Dennis Pettey, Audit Manager for the DOH, and Clark Graves, 
Assistant Attorney General assigned to this matter, admitted in 
the formal hearing of this matter that they were aware that Vali 
intended to make a claim for interest as early as December, 1984. 
(See 11 22, supra.) 
DOH FACT 24 - The check delivered to Vali, made refer-
ence to in paragraph 24, was not for the full settlement amount 
to Vali. The check for $274,223.17 represented payment on 
principal only, on issues raised in the informal hearing. It 
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should further be noted that the check contained no restrictive 
endorsement and no release of any claims accompanied the check, 
DOH has also misstated several facts in its "Response 
to Vali's Statement of Facts/1 at pp. 10-14 of its brief. Vali's 
response to those misstatements is as follows: 
1. DOH's assertions in paragraph 1 of its response 
facts consist largely of semantics and rhetoric that require no 
response. However, in response to the last sentence of paragraph 
lf Vali submits that Form 271-A's are submitted and paid on the 
basis of the rate that was established from previously submitted 
FCPs. In Vali's case, DOH did not use its FCPs, but instead, 
established an arbitrary interim rate from which the Form 271-A's 
would be paid. Therefore, while Vali may have been timely paid 
on a monthly basis for its Form 271-A's, the basis for its claim, 
that was ultimately resolved in its favor even by DOH, is that it 
was not paid the amount to which it was actually entitled. 
2. In response to DOH's response paragraph 3, Vali 
submits that it has not asked this Court to determine the precise 
dates when payments were due to Vali, nor the amounts due, in 
order to reach a conclusion as to the amount of interest owing. 
Indeed, that calculation will be a fairly complex undertaking 
that will require an evidentiary hearing, which has thus far been 
denied Vali due to the trial court's denial of its interest claim 
as a matter of law. In any event, as has been discussed previ-
ously in this brief, and as will be discussed more fully 
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hereinafter, DOH's gratuitous, self-serving and unsupported 
representation that circumstances "were not normal because Vali 
grossly overstated its claims," is an utter falsehood that is 
entirely without factual foundation. 
3. DOH's response paragraph 4 is yet another self-
serving, unsupported recitation of alleged "fact." It should be 
noted that the reason for the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud's conduct 
is, at best, a matter of pure speculation in this proceeding. 
4. In its response paragraph 5, DOH suggests that 
Vali's claim that its business records were essentially destroyed 
by the criminal investigation is a fabrication. There is, 
however, a factual foundation for that contention (See 11 13 
hereof), and the mere denial of it in DOH's Answer hardly estab-
lishes that the allegation is false. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EXTINGUISHMENT DOES NOT EXIST IN THIS STATE 
AND IS CONTRARY TO ITS PUBLIC POLICY. 
In DOH's Response Brief, it contends that Vali is not 
entitled to interest under the common law of Utah because (1) the 
issue of common law entitlement to interest was not raised in the 
court below, and (2) any right to interest that Vali may have had 
is now barred by the doctrine of "extinguishment." With respect 
to the first argument, the law in Utah is that "matters neither 
raised in the pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be 
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considered for the first time on appeal." Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Company, Inc., 692 *.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984). 
As DOH is well aware, the issue of Vali's common law 
interest entitlement was indeed considered by the lower court in 
this case. In fact, in his Memorandum Decision of February 11, 
1988, Judge Murphy resolved the majority of pending issues but 
specifically withheld decision on the issue of common law inter-
est entitlement, stating, "the only remaining theory available to 
Vali is premised on Utah cases allowing pre-judgment interest." 
Memorandum Decision p. 5. Thus, the entire purpose for the 
post-Memorandum Decision briefing was to discuss interest enti-
tlement under Utah common law. As such, it is somewhat disingen-
uous for DOH to now represent to this Court that the issue has 
never before been considered. 
DOH's second argument involves the concept of "extin-
guishment," which DOH claims bars Vali from recovery of interest. 
The concept of extinguishment, which appears to be accepted in 
only a few other jurisdictions, primarily on the basis of 
out-dated law, precludes recovery of interest where interest is 
sought as "damages" and the plaintiff has accepted payment of 
principal. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Riverview Gas 
Compression Co. , 409 F.Supp 486 (N.D.Tex. 1976) (refusing to 
apply extinguishment in that case, but citing, as authority for 
•hat concept, United Brothers of Friendship v. Kennedy, 133 3.W. 
253 (Tex.Civ.App. 1917) and 1 C.J. 546). Interest is recoverable 
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as "damages" when the right to its recovery is not based on a 
contract, express or implied. Seef e.g. , Ray F. Fischer Co. v. 
Loeffler-Green Supply Co,, 289 P.2d 139 (Okla. 1955). In the 
Fischer case, extinguishment was statutorily imposed, but the 
court managed to distinguish the case before it in order to avoid 
its application. 
In this case, there is, at least arguably, an implied 
contract to pay interest since Vali's claim is derived from a 
contract that, by statute, includes an interest provision. As 
such, Vali is not seeking interest as "damages," and the extin-
guishment concept would not be applicable even in those jurisdic-
tions that have adopted it. Notably, DOH refers this Court to 
American Jurisprudence on this issue, rather than to any case 
law. 
As the sole support for application of the extinguish-
ment concept in this State, DOH cites Cox Construction Co., Inc., 
v. State Road Commiss., 583 P.2d 85 (Utah 1978). Interestingly, 
Cox provides no support for the extinguishment concept. In fact, 
the only holding in Cox with respect to interest was that, based 
on the principle of accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff had 
conceded any right any right it may have had to recover interest. 
Significantly, the Cox court specifically noted that the parties 
"may well have reserved the issue of interest for the trial 
court's determination," but had failed to do so. 583 P.2d at 87. 
Thus, the Cox holding not only fails to support the 
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extinguishment concept, but is directly contrary to it. However, 
even the Phillips Petroleum court, which did recognize the 
extinguishment concept, noted that the plaintiffs' failure to 
!,reserv[e] their right to later sue for interest" was signifi-
cant. 409 F.Supp. at 493. From this, it appears that, even in 
jurisdictions that recognize the concept, extinguishment does not 
apply where, as here, the plaintiff reserved its right to claim 
interest when it accepted payment of principal. 
DOH has attempted to "bootstrap" its argument that Vali 
waived its right to interest into an argument that extinguishment 
bars its claim. As will be discussed more fully hereinafter, the 
evidence in this case fully supports the conclusions of both the 
ALJ and Judge Murphy that Vali in fact reserved its claim for 
interest against the DOH. As such, DOH's "extinguishment" 
argument is without merit. 
In any event, to impose any artificial device to deny 
recovery of interest simply because, as here, the plaintiff 
accepted payment of principal, with reservation of its right to 
recover interest, would be both arbitrary and in conflict with 
the public policy of this State. It is clear that Utah law 
favors the settlement of disputes. See, e.g., Alvin G. Rhodes 
Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1984). 
In this case, DOH delayed payment to Vali of sums legitimately 
due it for a period of not just days or weeks or months, but 
several years, during which time, Vali operated without 
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sufficient reimbursement and the DOH had use of its money. In 
the midst of that delay, Vali was faced with three options: (1) 
refuse any payment and litigate its entire claim, (2) accept 
payment of principal and waive any right to recover interest, or 
(3) accept payment of principal and reserve the right to interest 
as the sole issue for litigation. 
Vali chose the latter option, only to be met with DOH's 
arguments that (1) Vali waived its right to recover interest, a 
claim that was not accepted by either the ALJ or the trial judge 
in this case, and (2) even if Vali did not waive its right to 
interest, it cannot have it because of "extinguishment." Con-
trary to DOH's assertions, this case cannot logically be distin-
guished from the case of United States v. Consolidated Edison Co. 
of N.Y., Inc., 590 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). As in that case, 
the scenario proposed by DOH would put Vali to the "Hobson's 
choice" of accepting principal and no interest as its sole 
recovery, or going without the money to which it was entitled for 
an additional, unknown, period of time in order to litigate the 
entire matter, which would subject both Vali and the already 
overused court system to a burden that is justified against 
neither. Application of the extinguishment concept, at least as 
it has been defined by DOH, would effectively eliminate a 
plaintiff's incentive to settle any portion of its claim, since 
such a settlement would jeopardize, or do away with, the 
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remainder of the claim. Such a result would clearly be contrary 
to the public policy of this State. 
Vali is entitled to interest by both Utah common lawf 
existing since before 1890 (See Wasatch Min. Co. v. Crescent Min. 
Co. , 24 P. 586 (Utah 1890)) and by legislative enactment (Utah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-1). Acceptance of DOH's proposal to deny Vali 
this longstanding and well-established right is not justified by 
any lawr common or statutory, ever adopted in this State. DOH's 
extinguishment claim is but one more contrived effort to deprive 
Vali of what is its right—the payment of interest on amounts not 
paid when due, 
II. SECTION 15-1-1 ESTABLISHES A "RIGHT" TO 
RECOVER INTEREST ON AMOUNTS OVERDUE. 
In its brief in this matter, DOH contends that S 15-1-1 
does not "create" a cause of action for interest, but merely 
estaolishes the legal rate where a cause of action for interest 
is based on common law or contract. Therefore, DOH argues, 
Vali's claim is really a common law claim that is barred by the 
doctrine of extinguishment. Vali does claim entitlement to 
interest under the common law, and DOH's extinguishment argument, 
applicable only to that claim, has already been dealt with in 
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Section I hereof. However, Vali also claims a statutory "right" 
4 
to recover interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1. 
DOH's assertion that S 15-1-1 creates no cause of 
action for interest depends entirely upon its argument that, 
since a right to interest already existed at common law, enact-
ment of the statute could not "create" such a right. This novel 
proposition, for which no authority is cited, would effectively 
deprive the Utah legislature of the power to make law. Indeed, 
Vali is not aware of any principle that supports the proposition 
that a cause of action may not statutorily be created where it 
already exists at common law. In fact, legislatures routinely 
codify existing common law and sometimes add clarification or 
additional elements to claims. In this case, the Utah legisla-
ture clarified the applicable rate of interest, which apparently 
never had been specified at common law. 
DOH attempts to distinguish the statutes in United 
States v. Consolidated Edison, supra, and Girard Trust Co. v. 
United States, 270 U.S. 163 (1926) on the basis of their use of 
the term "shall" in relation to the recovery of interest. Thus, 
the New York statute in Consolidated Edison, began "interest 
shall be recovered . . . ," and the federal statute in Girard 
provided that "interest shall be allowed and paid . . . " In 
4
 VALI also claims a statutory right to interest pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. S 15-6-2, which claim is dealt with in Section III 
hereof. 
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contrast, but also in conformance with these statutes, the Utah 
statute provides that "the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money . . . shall be . . ." (emphasis added). 
Admittedly, this statute could have been nore artfully drafted. 
However, the term chosen by the Utah legislature is mandatory 
rather than permissive. Moreover, the Utah statute is not 
limited to situations where a common law right to interest 
exists, or where a contract specifically provides for interest 
but is silent as to its amount—limitations that could easily 
have been enacted. Instead, the legislature chose to provide 
that the rate of interest for the forbearance of money shall be 
6%. As such, it appears that the legislature intended that 
interest would, and should, be paid on overdue obligations in 
this State. 
Vali has established that it had a legal right to money 
that was not paid when due. The failure to make payment when due 
benefited DOH by its use of Vali's money for a substantial period 
of time. This is just the kind of situation that was meant to be 
encompassed within S 15-1-1, and Vali is entitled to recover 
interest pursuant to that statute, in addition to the common law 
of this State. 
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Had that process been handled in the ordinary course, as it could 
have been, in 1980, Vali would have received money back from DOH 
at that time and also would have received an accurate prospective 
rate. 
In fact, as shown in Vali's foregoing factual state-
ment, DOH's "dispute" was almost entirely a matter of 
documentation—something that arises in virtually any request for 
payment by FCPs. Furthermore, Vali was not given an opportunity, 
until some two years later, to go through the ordinary procedure 
of exit conferences, during which, documentation of its claim was 
requested and supplied. 
In addition, DOH continued to insist, for some four 
years, that Vali owed it money, without ever having given Vali an 
opportunity to document its claim. The delay was more than 
usually burdensome for Vali, as the criminal investigation had 
resulted in a loss of many of its necessary documents. In any 
event, the first time that DOH actually ran calculations on 
Vali's FCPs, after the exit conferences, in late 1984, it discov-
ered that Vali was entitled to receive money back. DOH then 
offered to pay Vali over $223,000. Ultimately, DOH paid Vali 
over $272,000, in principal only. 
Thus, DOH changed its position almost $450,000, from 
claiming $177,000 due to it, to paying Vali $272,000. At the 
same time, DOH claims in its brief that it originally "disal-
lowed" $760,000 of Vali's claim and ultimately "disallowed" 
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amounts that were not paid when due, and this case should be 
remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the 
amount of interest owed. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE ESTABLISHES THAT 
VALI DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO CLAIM ENTI-
TLEMENT TO INTEREST. 
DOH's entire argument to the effect that the settlement 
of principal bars Vali's claim for interest is premised on its 
utterly false representation to this Court that DOH was unaware 
of Vali's intention to claim interest until after the "settle-
ment" was entered and the principal had been paid. In fact, as 
detailed in Vali's foregoing Response to DOH's Statement of 
Facts, very early on in the negotiations, Vali made it clear to 
DOH that it was not conceding its right to claim interest. (See 
11 22 of Vali's Statement of Facts). Both DOH's attorney and its 
audit manager admitted as much at the formal hearing in this 
matter. Vali repeatedly refused to accept any tender of princi-
pal that was tied to execution of a release of its claim to 
interest. That refusal ultimately resulted in DOH's tender of a 
check to Vali that was unrestricted with respect to Vali's 
interest claim. 
DOH's assertion, in its brief, that it was unaware of 
Vali's intent to claim interest at the time of the "settlement" 
is a gross misrepresentation of both the facts and the record in 
this case. DOH was well awarp. nrinr t-o its agreement to pay and 
when it tendered in excess of $272,000.00 to Vali on or about May 
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